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Abstract 
The destroying tasks of high-risk hazardous chemical waste have a strict request to the health status of destruction 
equipment.The paper proposes the health status classification method based on time between failures for the 
destruction of equipment, set up health status assessment model based on Time-varying Bayesian Networks and the 
time slice, which can take advantage of history fault information and health status monitoring indicator information to 
health status assessment for the destruction equipment, and which provides a reliable and safe evaluation method. 
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1. Instruction 
The high-risk hazardous chemical waste is a kind of flammable, easily explosive, high toxicity and 
easy pollution material. And it needs special equipment for destroying. This kind of destroying equipment 
needs to be reliable and highly automatic, which has complicated structure and too much operation 
parameters. And it is difficult to manage the entire equipment status. With time going, many parts of the 
equipment aging, and the health status degrades, which consumedly increase the possibility of accident. 
Therefore, according to the equipment’s operation parameter and its system model, how to evaluate the 
health status of the equipment is an important problem at present.   
2. Health status classification of destruction equipment  
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Equipment health status is defined as the ability extent of keeping the equipment definite performance 
under currently operational environment, and the character parameters which exhibit the performance can 
make as the index of equipment health status [1]. So as to use the quantitative health index, we can assess 
the systematic health status. The health status judgment of the destruction equipment refers to the 
judgment of performance degradation or deviation degree of the current state and the desired state of 
normal operating performance. In the destruction operation, the object is a special high-risk waste, 
demanding security reliability equipment. Therefore, destruction equipment operating status cannot be 
simply failure and normal two states, and it should be more detailed descriptions of equipment current 
status. Health status is a more detailed description of a system state. 
We have a number of sensor modules installed in the special high-risk waste destruction equipment, 
which can real-time acquire device status data. However, on the one hand the installation of the sensors is 
limited, on the other the basis of real-time status data composed of the components and some subsystems 
of equipment are difficult to grasp. We can only collect some important data to the device during 
operation, for the various components of the device subsystem and element component level cannot fully 
take into account. Therefore, we finally get the device status data with small sample size, overall, real-
time characteristics. 
The destruction operation of the special high-risk waste is only about two months annually, the rest of 
the equipment in a sealed state. Therefore, we should pay more attention to the health status of the 
equipment during operation. Here, we have the equipment mean time between failures (MTBF) as the 
main basis of the division of equipment health status rating, divided into four levels: health, sub-health, 
worthy of use, disabled. If the device is no failure in the subsystem of the operating period of 2 months 
per year, as well as components, which means that the device does not require any maintenance during 
operation, then the device in a healthy state. Similarly, the failure of equipment, the average interval of 
less than one working day, that is not normal equipment operation, must be down for maintenance, and 
then the device is in fault condition. Specific health status classification is in Table 1. 
Table 1 Destruction of equipment health status classification 
Device Status levels  MTBF Description of health status 
Health greater than the annual 
operating time˄61 days˅ 
no failure at the subsystems and components at the component 
level 
Sub-health less than the annual operating 
time˄61 days˅.  
greater than the preventive 
maintenance interval  
Subsystem failure does not occur, the Ministry of components 
does not affect the operation performance, but also to complete 
the work; the need for the maintenance and strengthening of 
monitoring 
Worthy of use more than one working day 
less than the preventive 
maintenance interval 
Subsystem is a minor fault, but does not affect the operation and 
safety of the equipment; in need of repair and focus on 
Disabled less than one working day a serious failure has affected the safety of operations; requiring 
immediate repair or replacement. 
3. Idea of health status assessment for destruction equipment  
There are many health status assessment methods, such as modeling, analytic hierarchy process, fuzzy 
evaluation method, artificial neural network, Bayesian network-based method, gray theory, the extension 
theory [2]. Bayesian network is a very important tool; it has advantages for dealing with small sample 
data, learning and feedback in real time on the network, and thus in real time to determine a range of state 
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parameters of the equipment, which is suitable for assessment of health status of special high-risk waste 
destruction equipment. However, destruction equipment has complex structure, and the relationship 
between the various subsystems and components is difficult to clear, direct application of Bayesian 
networks for destruction equipment modeling is quite difficult. To Take into account, the device has a 
large number of historical fault information, we can construct a static fault tree, then the static fault tree is 
converted to dynamic Bayesian network model, so as to equipment history information can be taken full 
advantage of, which is easier to achieve in the operation, close to the actual operation, but also easy to 
avoid build errors. The main steps of health status assessment for destruction equipment are as follows: 
(1) History failure information combined with the destruction of the equipment structure is used to 
build up a static fault tree model for the destruction of equipment. 
(2) Through the transformation algorithm for static fault tree model to dynamic Bayesian networks, a 
dynamic Bayesian network model of the destroyed equipment is built. 
(3) According to the dynamic Bayesian network model for destruction equipment and the failure rate 
of component parts, we can calculate the initial failure rate of the destruction equipment, 
(4) Through the last failure information of destruction equipment and Bayes' theorem to update the 
failure rate of various components and parts, we can come to the posterior probability of component parts 
failure rate. For serviceable parts, the posterior probability of its failure rate should be higher than the 
prior probability. 
(5) The fragment of time and the time of acquisition. Every three minutes in accordance with the 
equipment feeding, defined time slice T per unit length as three minutes. Define acquisition time ct for 
from the discovery of the failure to equipment downtime of destruction equipment subsystems. The 
number of destroyed equipment to collect state data cn, cn = ct / T. 
(6) Through the acquisition of the operational status data of the destruction equipment, and the 
posterior probability of individual component failure rate, and the equipment failure rate formula based 
on multiple time slices, we can calculate the current failure rate of the equipment. 
(7) Through the relationship between the MTBF and failure rate, we can obtain the mean time between 
failures of the corresponding part of the equipment. 
(8) According to the mean time between failures of the corresponding part, we can determine the 
health level of the corresponding part of the destruction equipment from the health state classification 
table. 
4. Dynamic Bayesian network model of destruction equipment 
4.1. Static fault tree model of destruction equipment 
Destruction of equipment can be divided as the subsystem level, component level, and part level three 
levels. Subsystem-level includes loading system, incineration system, exhaust gas treatment system and 
control system. Also a number of components are included in each subsystem level. The specific structure 
is shown in Fig 1. 
Selecting the health status of the destruction equipment as the top event, according to fault information 
on the history, combined with the relationship between the various levels of the equipment, in accordance 
with the principles of constructing fault tree can be drawn from the static fault tree model of the 
destruction equipment, as shown in Fig 2. 
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Fig 1 Structure of incineration destruction equipment 
4.2. Conversion arithmetic of the dynamic Bayesian networks model and model building 
Static fault tree conversion to dynamic Bayesian networks has been a lot of related algorithms at home 
and abroad [3-4]. By comparing the various algorithms, combined with the actual special high-risk 
chemical waste destruction operations, improvement of the static fault tree algorithm to dynamic 
Bayesian networks are as follows:  
(1) All the basic events in fault tree express for the corresponded root node in the Bayesian network. If the 
basic affairs of the fault appear many times, it express only one root node in the Bayesian network.  
(2) The prior probability of the fault tree basic event directly assign to the corresponding root node of 
Bayesian network as its priori probability.  
(3) Each logic gate in the fault tree is expressed as a node in the Bayesian network, the node marks and the 
status value is consistent with the fault tree gate output event.  
(4) Connect nodes in the Bayesian network nodes in accordance with the relationship between expression 
in the fault tree logic gates and basic events, and connect the input-output relationship of the direction 
of the fault tree logic gates corresponding. 
(5) Express the logical relationship of the fault tree logic gate corresponding to the node's conditional 
probability tables for Bayesian network. 
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Fig 2 Static fault tree model of destruction equipment 
Static fault tree conversion algorithms to dynamic Bayesian networks of the destruction equipment are 
shown in Fig 3. 
In the figure, “Outcome” stands for health status of the system; A for the feeding system failure; A1, 
A2, A3, respectively, for the failure of the feeder, hydraulic lift failure and pump station failure; B for 
incineration system failure; B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, for a combustion chamber failure, failure of the 
secondary combustion chamber, fuel supply device failure, the failure of the device failure of the wind 
and blowing devices; C for exhaust gas treatment system failure; C1, C2, C3, respectively, for the heat 
exchanger device failure, lye spray device failure, the dust removal device failures; D control system 
failure; D1, D2, D3, and D4 respectively for the PLC failure, transformer failure, the failure of AC 
contactor, the failure of intermediate relay and air circuit breaker failure. Due to space limitations, the 
prior probability table of the various components of Bayesian networks and conditional probability is not 
listed, which will illustrate as example through the application of the dynamic Bayesian network. 
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Fig 3 Static fault tree conversion algorithms to dynamic Bayesian networks 
5. Failure rate calculation at each stage and health status level judgment for the equipment 
5.1. Failure rate calculation at each stage based on the Bayesian for the destruction equipment 
(1) The initial failure rate of the destruction equipment 
Application of the priori distribution of the basic components, according to the dynamic Bayesian 
network model of destruction equipment, based on the independent features [5-6], the probability of the 
initial failure rate of the destruction equipment can be obtained: 
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Where: xi, a value Xi state; yi, Yi values of the observed variables; pa (Yi), yi of the collection of the 
parent node; n is the hidden nodes in the network, m is the observation nodes in the network. 
(2) Failure rate based multiple time slice of destruction equipment 
By Equation (1), we can draw the initial health status of the destruction equipment based on dynamic 
Bayesian networks. But clearly, with the extension of the destruction equipment operating time, the health 
status of the equipment will change constantly, which is increasingly not consistent with our theoretical 
initial health status calculated. Thus we need to collect real-time status data of destruction equipment, 
through the learning of dynamic Bayesian networks, to amend the prior distribution of the various 
subsystems, as well as components and parts, to arrive at the subsequent posterior distribution, and 
eventually come to real-time dynamic Bayesian networks of the destruction equipment. 
Equipment real-time status data got, assume that node xi corresponding event yj occur, xi 
corresponding posterior probability of failure rate: 
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ię[1,n], ję[1,m]         Where parameters are coincident with (1). 
It should be noted that real-time data acquisition and selected data process should focus on selected 
sample of device status parameters, in order to make a dynamic Bayesian network model established 
closer to the destruction equipment operating status reality. In this paper, we select the state parameters of 
equipment failure when the first three minutes, each time slice 3, where the fault is the last fault history of 
equipment occurred. Three minutes selected as fault condition parameter is due to special high-risk waste 
destruction feeding once every three minutes. In this way, the representative device parameters make the 
model closer to the actual operation, the error is smaller. 
198   Hongyuan Zhang et al. /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  16 ( 2012 )  192 – 201 
Combination the length of time from the discovery of the health status “disabled” of the equipment to 
its completely shut down, we can calculate the required number of time slice, thus to get a set of observed 
values of device status. 
T time slice going with dynamic Bayesian networks, due to the observed value is only a combination of 
state, so this observation equipment health status is as follows: 
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    Where: xi represents the posterior probability of the failure rate of various components. yij for 
conditional probability of the j time slices of component parts, n is the component number , m is the 
network nodes, ie, the number of conditional probability. 
How can obtain the conditional probability of each node from the observed values of the device 
parameters? In this paper, the fuzzy membership function is used. Through the use of triangular 
membership function, observations of the device status parameter can be converted into the conditional 
probability of each node.      
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Where: x for the observations of device status parameters; f (x) for the probability of the initial 
conditions, [a, c] for the fluctuation range of the device normal operation parameters, b for the optimal 
value of the device status parameter. 
5.2. Health status level judgment for the destruction equipment 
The conversion formula of MTBF and failure rate of various stages is as flows: 
³ 
Ğ
0
R(t)dt  MTBF ; O1/(t)dt)dtȜ(-expMTBF
t
0
Ğ
0
  ³³                                (5) 
  Where: Ȝ is the failure rate and MTBF is mean time between failure (hours), R (t) stands for the 
probability of the normal operation from its run (t = 0) to a time t. 
According to MTBF of the corresponding part, we can determine the health level of the corresponding 
part of the destruction equipment from the health state classification table 1. 
6. Example 
We illustrate the above decision algorithm from the subsystem of destruction equipment - the 
incineration system.  
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6.1. Judgment of the initial health status of the incineration system 
According to the above dynamic Bayesian network model of incineration system, we can get its failure 
prior probability of all its integral parts and component. We selected the failure rate data of each part of 
component from some of the products the factory manual, and references[7-10]. Since most of the 
components and parts are electronic devices, the rest belong to the machinery or machine equipment, the 
failure rate distribution can be viewed as the exponential distribution. Various infrastructure components 
of the initial failure rate are in Table 2. 
Table 2 The initial failure rate of the basic components of the incineration system  
Parts component failure rate parameter  
Ȝ (/ h) 
parts component failure rate parameter  
Ȝ (/ h) 
combustion 1.401×10-4 1st pump 54.136×10-6 
Door 26.3×10-5 
oil 
installations 2nd pump 54.136×10-6 
First 
combustion 
chamber 
Motorized Faders 38.2×10-5 wind device induced draft fan 0.307×10-5 
combustion 1.401×10-4 Fan motor 20.798×10-6 
Thermocouple 3.4×10-6 Dampers 38.10322×10-6 
Impeller components 12.5×10-6 
Secondary 
combustion 
chamber 
pressure sensors 77.778×10-6 
blast device 
Throttle controller 45.35923×10-6 
The various components of the incineration system are exponential distribution, so the burning system 
failure rate distribution is the exponential distribution. By the formula (1),and Microsoft MSBNX 
software, we can conclude that the initial incineration system failure rate: Ȝ = 2.361 × 10-4. 
The MTBF of the incineration system shall be obtained by the formula (4): 
MTBF of = 1 / ¬ = 4235.49h, and about 176 days. 
According to Table 1, we can conclude the initial health status is health. 
6.2. Judgment  of the operation health status of the incineration system  
We set all kinds of sensors for operation condition monitoring of incineration system, and the dynamic 
data acquisition was real-time deposited in Oracel database. We choose one history failure data of 
incineration system in Table 3. 
Table 3 the last burning of the various components of the system failure 
component Failure time component Failure time 
1st pump 2011-7-1 8:53:57 2nd pump 2011-7-1 8:53:59 
Door 2011-7-1 8:54:07 blast device 2011-7-1 8:54:59 
In the case of the incineration system has failed, by the formula (2), and Microsoft MSBNX software, 
the various components failure rate updates, see Table 4. Failure rate changes in the three parts of a 
combustion chamber, the four components of the two components of the oil installations and blowing 
devices. 
Table 4 Posteriori failure rate of various infrastructure components of the incineration system 
200   Hongyuan Zhang et al. /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  16 ( 2012 )  192 – 201 
Parts component failure rate parameter  Ȝ (/ h) parts component failure rate parameter Ȝ (/ h) 
combustion 1.625×10-4 1st pump 2.783×10-4 
Door 7.83×10-4 
oil 
installations 2nd pump 2.783×10-4 
First 
combustio
n chamber 
Motorized Faders 4.19×10-4 wind device induced draft fan 0.307×10-5 
combustion 1.401×10-4 Fan motor 41.251×10-6 
Thermocouple 3.4×10-6 Dampers 80.94172×10-6 
Impeller 
components 
27.4×10-6 
Secondary 
combustio
n chamber 
pressure sensors 77.778×10-6 
blast device 
Throttle 
controller 
93.72335×10-6 
In the process of burning subsystem operation, from the discovery of the burning subsystem fails to 
equipment downtime takes about 15 minutes, ie, ct = 15. In the case of once every 3 minutes acquisition 
incineration system state data, the time fragment length T = 3 minutes, cn = ct / T, that is, cn = 5. 
Therefore, we collected 5 fragment real-time deposits of the incineration system operation state data, in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 Observational data in a run of the incineration system 
Fragment of time 
(three minutes) 
First combustion chamber 
temperature˄ć˅ 
Secondary combustion chamber 
temperature ć˅ 
Furnace negative pressure˄pa˅ 
1 1263 1456 -31 
2 1322 1516 -23 
3 1298 1482 -27 
4 1275 1473 -28 
5 1281 1476 -26 
First combustion chamber temperature fluctuation range˖[1100,1300]ˈThe temperature of the best 
condition:1200ć 
Secondary combustion chamber temperature fluctuation range˖[1200,1600]ˈThe temperature of the best 
condition:1400ć 
Remarks 
Furnace negative pressure fluctuation range˖[-10,-40]ˈThe negative pressure of the best condition: -25 pa 
According to Table 4, Table 5, the formula (3), (4),(5),  and  Microsoft MSBNX software, we can 
draw at this time the burning system MTBF = 1301h, about 54 days. 
The preventive maintenance intervals of incineration system are usually half of the operating cycle, 
which is 30 days. According to table 1, the incineration system at this time is the sub-health state. 
7. Conclusion 
Due to high demand for reliability, security of special high-risk chemical waste destruction equipment 
operation, real-time control of the health status of the equipment is required. On the basis of clear concept 
of health status, combined with the actual operation of destruction equipment, destruction equipment 
health status classification method based on the mean time between failures is set up. Bayesian networks 
suitable for handling small sample data, real-time network for learning and feedback in real time to 
determine the characteristics of a series of the device state parameters, based on failure tree and the use of 
the improved conversion algorithm, this paper establish dynamic Bayesian network model of health status 
for the destruction equipment. Combination of operating conditions, through the acquisition of T time 
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fragments of the destroyed equipment status data, the posterior probability of the composition of 
components to be updated, and come to the destruction of equipment, real-time health status, eventual 
realization of a dynamic monitoring of the health status of the destruction equipment, which provides a 
more secure and reliable assessment method for special high-risk chemical waste destruction operations. 
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